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Abstract: As the euro crisis unfolds, political discourse on both sides of the 
European Union (EU)’s internal divide—“North” and “South”—becomes ever 
more exasperated, distant and untranslatable. At the root lies a weak pan-
European sense of belonging—a common political identity thanks to which 
European citizens may regard each other as equals, and therefore as deserving 
recognition, trust, and solidarity. This paper describes some of the culture-
related problems that impact directly on the formation of an eventual political 
identity for EU citizens. It then suggests that the enacting of an interculturalist 
paradigm can help untie some of the nuts—political but also cultural—that 
Europe faces in order to solve the economic crisis. A few remarks are dedicated 
in the conclusive part to cultural pluralism in Singapore, a key player in any 
future progress towards the integration of the Asia Pacific Region. 
Keywords: Asia-Pacific, EU, euro crisis, European citizens, interculturalism, 
political identity, transcultural dialogue 
Oaks, ants, and Europeans 
On Thursday May 31 2012 Thomas Steffen, a director general in the German 
ministry of finance caused a stir in Brussels at a conference organised by the 
European Commission. In response to the suggestion by Italy’s Prime Minister 
Mario Monti, that Germany was been too slow to help indebted countries in the 
euro zone, Steffen urged such countries to turn from “grasshoppers” who 
enjoyed the summer spending a lot of money,” into “ants” who worked instead 
during summer preparing for winter. 
Phillippe Aghion, a French economist based at Harvard University, suggested 
for the present crisis a different fable from the same author (Jean de La 
Fontaine): that of the oak despising the bamboo’s flexibility, until a storm comes 
and the first one breaks but the second survives. Steffen retorted that it was “not 
a German oak”. He compared the “southern” (mainly Mediterranean) euro zone 
countries with East Germany during the re-unification process, where huge 
amounts of money invested have still not had satisfactory results.3 
                                           
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Union Studies Association Asia-
Pacific (EUSA AP), EU’s Unknown Asia: New Horizons and New Beginnings conference held 
on the 4 – 5 June 2012, at the National University of Singapore. I thank participants for 
helpful comments and insights, as well as EUSA AP and the ANU Centre for European 
Studies for making it materially possible for me to attend the conference and write this paper. 
2 Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University; Centre for 
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Unthinkable as it was only a few months ago, by the middle of 2012 top EU 
officials were sending alarm signals publicly that something had to be done soon 
to fight the crisis. Olli Rehn, vice-president of the European Commission and 
Commissioner for Economic and monetary affairs and the Euro, warned that 
the single currency area could disintegrate without stronger crisis-fighting 
mechanisms and tough fiscal discipline.4 
Even more disturbingly, Mario Draghi said that the European Central Bank 
(which he heads) could not “fill the vacuum left by member states’ lack of 
action.” European leaders, he added, had to decide whether to stand by the 
eurozone: “the sooner the vision is clarified the better for the European Union”.5 
What steps are needed to address this profound crisis? The first and most 
evident one is a series of sensible economic measures. Suggestions abound. We 
will mention a few to illustrate. 
The easier bit: economic remedies 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman believes that with some 
adjustments (looser monetary policy, tolerance to possible short-term increase 
in inflation, open-ended lending to governments and banks) the crisis can be 
averted.6 It has become clear from the situations not only in Greece (which owes 
euro area governments and institutions an equivalent of 3% of the zone’s GDP)7 
but notably in Spain (the fourth largest economy after Germany, France and 
Italy), that the present remedies are insufficient and more vigorous—and above 
all more coordinated—action is required. 
Several analysts suggested that, since the euro zone’s problem is not its debt 
size but its fragmented structure, some sharing of the burden and some ceding 
of sovereignty by all the euro zone countries could tackle the difficulties 
successfully. Compared with over 100% in the US, the euro zone public debt is 
less than 90% of GDP.8 Concretely, they propose to “fill in two holes in the 
single currency’s original design.” First, to create a euro-zone, supranational 
system of “supervision, recapitalisation, deposit insurance and regulation” for 
(at least the most important) banks. Second, to mutualise eurozone 
governments, at least that above 60% of GDP for any particular member 
country, to be paid over the next 25 years, therefore limited Eurobonds.9 
The idea of a “banking union” was also presented formally by the 
Commission, in order to break the vicious circle of weak banks and indebted 
                                                                                                                           
http://euobserver.com/19/116443. 
4 Marc Jones and Jan Strupczewski, "Ecb, Eu Officials Warn Euro's Survival at Risk," 
Reuters(2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/01/us-eurozone-inflation-
idUSBRE84U0E320120601. 
5 Louise Armitstead, "Eurozone Is 'Unsustainable' Warns Mario Draghi," The Telegraph(2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9304027/Eurozone-is-unsustainable-
warns-Mario-Draghi.html. 
6 Martin Hesse and Thomas Schulz Paul Krugman, "'Right Now, We Need Expansion'," Spiegel 
Online(2012), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/interview-with-economist-
paul-krugman-on-euro-zone-rescue-efforts-a-834566.html. 
7 "Cutting up Rough,"  The Economist(2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21555923. 
8 "The Choice,"  The Economist, no. 26 May 2012 (2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21555916. 
9 Ibid. 
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governments lending to each other.10  But economic solutions require political 
agreements. 
Paymasters and legitimacy scruples 
Chancellor Angela Merkel has been blamed for the fate of many a Greek, and for 
austerity and unemployment in battered countries across Europe, she has been 
caricatured as a fearless, steely Prussian,11 even as a Nazi,12 labelled as inflexible 
and stubborn.13 On closer inspection, however, the most important political 
leader of the EU is deeply concerned that “more Europe” from the economic 
point of view (fiscal and banking integration), implies more sacrifices from 
European citizens. Neither member state nor European authorities can just 
assume that their citizens are happy to undertake those sacrifices. The 
“democratic deficit” that had long worried the architects of integration (and 
some scholars) in times where “output legitimacy” sufficed for European 
citizens not to bother asking much, has become acute and must be addressed. 
Ms Merkel wants to see the “dangerous disconnection between national 
politics and national parliaments, and the European Parliament,” addressed, as 
the only way in which the monetary union can survive.14 In fact, her style of 
leadership apart, she may have a point, a point especially and increasingly 
important for ordinary European citizens. Since the beginning of the euro crisis 
17 member state leaders have been ejected from office.15 With no way to 
influence Brussels directly, European citizens have voted against incumbents 
nationally, and shifted preferences to fringe and sometimes radical parties. At 
every election for the European Parliament the turnout across the continent has 
plumbed (from just above 60% in 1979 to under 45% in 2009). Fringe parties, 
which have doing well in member state elections, do even better in votes for 
Strasbourg.16 An alternative could be in greater participation of national 
parliaments at a European level. 
Elsewhere I have tried to address the problem of political integration 
suggesting that Europe does not have a demos, rather demoi, and that an 
analogical polity is not only a feasible—if hybrid and complex—solution, but also 
more desirable due to the specificity of Europe, its rich multi-national diversity, 
and the wish—or tolerance—of Europeans to only a certain degree of 
                                           
10 Jan Strupczewski, "Eu Calls for Euro Zone Banking Union, Direct Bank Recapitalisations," 
Reuters(2012), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/05/30/uk-eu-economy-eurozone-
idUKBRE84T0KF20120530. 
11 Michael White, "European Debt Crisis: Better Merkozy Than Bismarck and Daladier," The 
Guardian(2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2011/dec/05/european-debt-
crisis-merkozy-bismarck.  
12 Elizabeth Flock, "Angela Merkel Depicted as Nazi in Greece, as Anti-German Sentiment 
Grows," The Washington Post(2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/angela-merkel-depicted-as-nazi-in-
greece-as-anti-german-sentiment-grows/2012/02/10/gIQASbZP4Q_blog.html.  
13 John Vinocur, "Merkel’s Stubborn March of Folly," The New York Times(2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/opinion/merkels-stubborn-march-of-folly.html. 
14 Ibid. 
15 "An Ever-Deeper Democratic Deficit,"  The Economist(2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21555927. 
16 Ibid. 
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integration.17 This has been characteristic of the European project right from the 
start.18 
Yet what can be the ground for such hybrid, or “analogical” integration? If it 
is true that political union can create some common identity, it is also true that 
at least some cultural affinity predisposes and enables the existence of a polity.19 
However the source of political unity, the common identity requires a weaker, 
analogical character, whereby European citizens can relate to each other with 
some level of closeness, even though much less than the closeness that exists 
between compatriots.20 
One condition for the emergence of a common political identity is an open an 
inclusive public sphere that allows European citizens to discuss and participate 
in the construction and life of the polity, allowing for their cultural differences 
to be taken into account inasmuch as possible.21 Yet an open space that excludes 
no one is still not enough. Beyond pure tolerance, it involves recognition, 
interrelation and intercultural exchange. Let us investigate this further. 
In search of roots for European solidarity 
The fabled controversy about ants and grasshoppers, oaks and bamboos, which 
occurred recently not in the kindergarten of a remote European town, but 
among high ranking officials and scholars at the headquarters of the European 
Union in Brussels, is very telling. The crisis, Anton La Guardia remarks, “has 
confirmed countries in their prejudices.”22 
Sharing burdens and giving up more sovereignty, even if in a controlled, 
limited way, requires the implementation of greater integration. But both, 
economic and political integration imply a sense of solidarity, of common 
political (“European”) identity that justifies at least moderate sacrifices being 
made for each other. Michael Burda considers that “The limit of German 
brotherhood extended to East Germany,” and Germans “saw what happened 
with two trillion euros over the past 20 years. And these are people they love. 
They don’t consider the Greeks their brothers.”23 
Yet clichés are not patented to Greeks and Germans alone. Europe is a region 
of the world in which many national groups have defined themselves, for 
                                           
17 Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, "Eu Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos 
Problems," European Law Journal 18, no. 4 (2012). 
18 Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, "Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, 
and Integration Paradigms Revisited,"  (2012). 
19 See: Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, "Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-
Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe," Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
European Studies Volume 2, No 2 / Volume 3, No 1., no. May/June 2011 (2011). 
20 Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, "Eu Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without 
Binding)," Australia National University Centre for European Studies Briefing Paper Series 
1, no. 2 (2010). 
21 Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, "Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of 
Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe," (Forthcoming). 
22 Anton La Guardia, "The Ailing Euro," Diplomaatia, no. June 2012 (2012), 
http://www.diplomaatia.ee/index.php?id=242&L=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1428&tx_ttnews[
backPid]=606&cHash=2585e667a0.  
23Reported by: Nicholas Kulish, "Germany Looks to Its Own Costly Reunification in Resisting 
Stimulus for Greece," The New York Times(2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/26/world/europe/german-reunification-pains-inform-
stance-on-greece.html?pagewanted=all. 
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centuries, at least partially in reference to “the other” next door who is not “like 
us”. At any rate, the reality is more complex. Europeans do find some 
similarities with each other when they are abroad, say in Africa or Asia. For all 
their differences, they usually like to think of themselves as not the same as 
(even if often in sympathy with) Americans. When they work at supra-state 
institutions (e.g. the EU, or the Council of Europe), participate in student 
mobility programs (like Erasums), or express conceptions of culture and life-
style (say, about food, history, the economy, the state), they find themselves less 
far from each other than they thought they were. Using Mr Burda’s image above, 
they may not perceive themselves as siblings, but perhaps as “cousins” or 
“distant relatives,” someone they know either because they have done business 
together, because geography has made them visit each other often, or even 
because they have fought wars against each other several times along the 
centuries. 
If solidarity (even a mitigated one, because it is trans-statal across Europe) is 
to operate from one member state to the other, from one region to the next, 
from one European citizen to the one in front of her, there has to be something 
they can feel as possessing in common,24 something that identifies them as part 
of the same political community, even if such political community being a 
collection of states, is not itself a state. A common identity that makes the other 
27 member states and especially the other 16 eurozone countries, see with 
concern, at least to a certain extent as their own, the problems Greece is 
facing.25 
In a very interesting comparative analysis between the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the present predicament of the EU, Krastev expresses astonishment 
before “the horrifying inability of the southern debt-ridden countries to 
‘translate’ their concern into German,” and at the “growing failure of Germany 
to ‘translate its proposed solutions into the local languages of most of the other 
member states.” The problem is not, in his view, one of diverging interests, but 
rather of “lack of empathy.”26  
And empathy, that capacity to “enter” into not only what the other “feels” but 
also what happens to him and the way he experiences it, certainly facilitates 
solidarity. In order to understand the other in that way, with empathy, some 
perceived commonalities help. Not comprehensive commonalities perhaps, but 
at least those that permit solidarity at the level of a broad political community, 
as is the case of the EU. Thus we can speak of (common) political identity as 
that atmosphere that allows solidarity. 
In order to come to existence, political identity requires some material 
elements that are substantive—for instance the familiar political culture of 
                                           
24 See an explanation of the problem in: Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, "Exploring 
Cosmopolitan Communitarianist Eu Citizenship – an Analogical Reading," Open Insight: 
Revista de Filosofía 2, no. 2 (2011). And possible answers in: Pablo C Jiménez Lobeira, 
"Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach," Australian Journal of 
Professional and Applied Ethics 12, no. 1 & 2 (2010). 
25 Maxime Pinard, "L'europe, Ce Géant En Mal D'identité," Le Monde(2012), 
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/05/16/l-europe-ce-geant-en-mal-d-
identite_1701613_3232.html. 
26 Ivan Krastev, "How Real Is the Risk of Disintegration? The Lessons of the Soviet Collapse," 
Diplomaatia(2012), 
http://www.diplomaatia.ee/index.php?id=242&L=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1426&tx_ttnews[b
ackPid]=606&cHash=540e9b202a. 
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human rights—and others that are formal—as is an open and inclusive public 
sphere, that sets an atmosphere for dialogue. But it also requires active elements 
that realise, build and renew the collective identity of the political community. 
One of them is relationality, which operates through intercultural exchange. 
Interculturalism: towards a common identity 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the instant solution to the present 
economic crisis in Europe is interculturalism. As has been shown above, the 
problems are very specific and demand adequate (and urgent) action. Yet it is 
also clear that economic solutions require political decisions, and in democratic 
polities—like every single member state of the EU—those decisions require 
legitimacy—the mandate or at least assent—of the citizens. But such assent 
becomes a difficult issue because European citizens can hardly see themselves 
as part of the same community, as “political siblings,” in the way in which they 
see compatriots in their own member state. 
Interculturalism starts from the idea that culture is an undeniable aspect of 
being human, and therefore of human beings and human groups. Like 
multiculturalism, it agrees that cultural differences should be acknowledged in 
constitutional democracies, in order to ensure for culturally diverse individuals 
and groups some respect and tolerance, and to avoid explicit or implicit 
discrimination on the basis of those differences. But beyond multiculturalism, 
interculturalism suggests another step: that of the cultural interaction and 
exchange. Under a relational paradigm whereby I do not only respect the other 
but actually converse with her, learn from her, appreciate her in what she is—
also in her culture, and expect a similar attitude in return, the barriers of strict 
tolerance, which end up creating ghettos and even parallel societies, recede.27 
One obstacle to this relational interaction is the absence of a common 
language. Krastev’s image of Germans and Greeks not being able to “translate” 
into the language of the other their views and needs as the crisis continues to 
unfold and the EU is on the brink of collapse, is a powerful image. He was not, 
of course, speaking of literal translations from Greek to German, and the other 
way around—a considerable amount of the EU’s yearly budget is destined to pay 
for translations to its 23 (soon 24) official languages. But what can constitute 
that transcultural language that facilitates dialogue? 
Among others, Mauricio Beuchot has suggested that such common ground 
could be constituted by the idea of human rights.28 His main concern is the 
problem of cultural plurality present in several Latin American countries, 
eminently in Mexico, where still today a mainstream Western culture, mainly 
come from Europe through Spain, must interact with many pre-Columbian 
indigenous cultures which have survived into the XXI century.29 The idea could 
                                           
27 Pierpaolo Donati, "Beyond the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism: Recognition through 
‘Relational Reason’," International Review of Sociology 19, no. 1 (2009). 
28 Mauricio Beuchot, Interculturalidad Y Derechos Humanos, Filosofía (México, D. F.: 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Siglo XXI, 2005). 
29 Mexico for example recognises, besides Spanish, more than 60 other languages, come from 
Aztecs, Mayans and other peoples, and used by their descendants in everyday life. Nahuatl, 
for instance, the language spoken by the Aztecs and preserved through the Conquest thanks 
to the work of Spanish missionaries that put this and other languages into writing, is spoken 
by over 4 million people. See: "Catálogo De Las Lenguas Indígenas Nacionales," Instituto 
Nacional de las Lenguas Indígenas (INALI), http://www.inali.gob.mx/clin-inali/#agr. 
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be useful, a fortiori, in Europe, cradle of the modern conception of human 
rights. 
They are a concept deeply rooted in the culture of Europeans, a ground on 
which everybody roughly agrees. Greeks may not be siblings to Germans, but 
certainly they are a people who believes deeply, as Germans do, in human 
rights—Greece has plausible claims to be one of the springs of European (and 
Western) civilisation. The two countries may be different, but not as different so 
as not to have certain similarities, even if as “distant relatives” in the European 
family. 
To conclude I must mention that interculturalism is always closely related to 
education, because the attitudes and dispositions for intercultural exchange 
require not only rationality on the part of the actors, but also certain virtues that 
may not come naturally to everyone, the capacity to listen and learn from the 
other for instance. Another aspect essential to interculturalism as the engine 
that propels the construction of political identity is its capacity to harmonise 
unity and diversity, which has been developed by Beuchot’s “analogical 
hermeneutics” to suggest an “analogical cultural pluralism,” which again for 
lack of time I leave for a forthcoming article.  
Interculturalism, together with other factors, can contribute to the creation of 
an identity that respects and cherishes national diversity, but that provides too 
the minimum of unity necessary for the European polity to survive. 
Singapore: An Interesting Microcosm for Europe? 
A reader might wonder how a tiny island in Asia, a city-state with less than 1% 
of the population of the EU could be of any relevance to the topic we are dealing 
with. To be clear, neither am I stating necessarily that the European experience 
should be applied in Singapore, or that Singapore should be taken as a model of 
harmony for Europe. Others might be better placed to argue for or against these 
propositions. At this stage, I would just like to carry out a preliminary 
exploration into this “microcosm” for two reasons. 
First, because Singapore has striven to harmonise different cultural groups 
right from its constitution as a unitary parliamentary republic, nearly 50 years 
ago. Some of the minorities who present a challenge to a common identity have 
cultural traits similar to those of minorities and immigrants in Europe, (those of 
Muslim background). What has the experience of Singapore been in this 
respect? That might be of interest to the EU. 
Second, because Singapore is and will be a key element in the development of 
any successful integration of the Asia Pacific Region. Due to its location, its size 
and its prosperity, it is in Singapore’s interest to live in a peaceful and 
prosperous region, and to cultivate links of exchange with surrounding 
countries. How feasible can that be in the Asia Pacific? How much do cultural 
differences matter if one is to judge from past (and present) European 
experience? That might be of interest to Singapore and indeed to the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or even to the ambitious Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. 
Singapore is a city-state with over 5 million inhabitants.30 Consistently for 
more about centuries, the ethnic composition of the population has remained 
                                           
30 Shirley Hsiao-Li Sun, "Social Reproduction and the Limits of a Neoliberal Approach: The Case 
of Singapore," Citizenship Studies 16, no. 2 (2012): 223. 
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roughly the same: above three quarters Chinese, close to 14% Malay, and 7% 
Indian.31 Singapore, in turn, is surrounded by what Mutalib calls “the Malay 
world” of Southeast Asia, consisting of 250 million people with ethnic, linguistic 
and religious affinity.32 Notwithstanding their being the indigenous ethnic 
group, the Malay Muslim community has remained on the socio-economic and 
political margins of society. Malays are underrepresented in the armed forces, 
police, intelligence services, the judiciary, university enrolments, average 
household income and house ownership.33 
Since practically all the Malays are Muslims (compared to two-thirds of 
Chinese who are Buddhists or Taoists, and 55% of Indians who are Hindus).34 
Therefore this specific minority issue acquires in Singapore not only racial, 
socio-economic, geo-political and historical, but also religious tonalities. 
Singapore’s “minority dilemma”35 can be articulated, at least from the point of 
view of the city-state’s political identity, in terms of the challenge of promoting 
the unity of the political community (all Singaporean citizens) while respecting 
and integrating a distinct minority which has lagged behind in the country’s 
development to this date. “Integration” cannot mean simple assimilation to the 
majority culture (ethnic Chinese), any more than “respect” can mean letting 
Malays drift away as a parallel sub-society. 
Defined by Mutalib as an “illiberal democracy” operating under a “one-party 
system” which seeks to ensure “compliance with its worldviews and the 
preservation of its electoral mandate” in return for economic prosperity for 
citizens, the Singaporean government-state has used three strategies on its 
“nation-building” strategy: multiracialism, meritocracy and secularism.36 
Initially multiracialism was implemented through the adoption of four 
official languages (Chinese, Malay, Tamil and English), the introduction of 
compulsory National Service, the use of English as the main language for 
administration and an integrated school system. The original inspiration of a 
social “melting pot” for Singapore turned into a more modest aspiration to at 
least a “salad bowl,” but eventually it turned into a “return to ethnic roots” 
policy around 1980. Meritocracy contained the idea that citizens should be able 
to advance in society “solely” thanks to their “hard work”. “Secularism” entailed 
that all communities in the Republic were free to engage in their respective 
religious pursuits but mindful, at the same time, “about the equal need to 
respect the different religious bearings of fellow citizens”.37 
Since the country’s independence, the Singaporean government has declared 
Malay the “national language,” chosen Malay lyrics for the national anthem, 
offered free tuition and bursaries for post-primary level Malay students, lowered 
the cost of land for building mosques, instituted a ministry for Muslim affairs, 
                                           
31 Hussin Mutalib, "Singapore Muslims: The Quest for Identity in a Modern City-State," Journal 
of Muslim Minority Affairs 25, no. 1 (2005). 
32 Comprising to different extents countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, or Thailand, 
among others. See: Hussin Mutalib, "The Singapore Minority Dilemma," Asian Survey 51, no. 
6 (2011). 
33 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, "Governing Muslims in Singapore's Secular Authoritarian State," 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 2 (2012). 
34 Ibid., 71. 
35 Mutalib, "The Singapore Minority Dilemma," 1171. 
36 Hussin Mutalib, "Singapore’s Ethnic Relations’ Scorecard," Journal of Developing Societies 
28, no. 1 (2012): 32 - 39. 
37 Ibid., 39-40. 
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and establishing a “presidential council” of minority affairs.38 However it seems 
that the third aspect of the nation-building strategy, secularism, has created at 
least as many problems as it intended to solve. This happens both, due to a 
“zealous maintenance of secularism as State ideology, at a time when religious 
revivalism has been on the ascendancy in the Republic,” but also due to the 
conceptions that the different faiths have about the relation between politics 
and religion.39 More specifically, 
For Malays, the dictum of giving Caesar and god their respective 
domains comes in conflict with the Islamic Faith, which looks at 
religion as an all-encompassing “way of life.” Thus, secularism has 
enabled the State to legislate a number of parliamentary bills that 
were objected to by religious communities… Intriguinly, these 
governmental maneuvers seem to show that in the main, the burden 
to comply with the rule of separating religion from politics falls on 
the shoulders of the citizens, more than the State. 40 
The unsatisfied wish by the Malay community to independently manage their 
madrasahs (Islamic religious schools), and the banning of tudungs (Islamic 
headscarves) on grounds of school uniformity (from which Sikhs, however, are 
exempted) have only added to the tension. And Malays are required, even in 
public discourse by Lee Kuan Yew—according to Rahim view the Singaporean 
equivalent to Kemal Atatürk in Turkey41—to show their allegiance to Singapore 
given not only their race, but also their Muslim religion, especially after 9/11 in 
2001.42 
Reportedly, the former Prime Minister (and now “Minister Mentor”) Lee 
Kuan Yew considers Islam an obstacle to progress (at least in Singapore), a 
religion which unlike the other ones cannot be integrated, and which makes its 
faithful “distinct and separate”.43 And the no-tudung policy for schoolgirls has, 
in Rahim’s words, 
Raised questions pertaining to the rights of religious minorities in the 
secular authoritarian state, its multicultural and multiracial 
credentials, the rights of children to education, the actual religious 
obligations of Muslim women, the perceived threat of Islamic 
revivalism and the national security agenda of the predominantly 
Chinese society in an overwhelmingly region.44 
At stake appears to be the “Sino-centred national identity and, perhaps most 
significantly, the PAP government’s fear of loosening its grip on power.”45  
Rahim seems to place in the State’s “assertive secularism” an obstacle to “the 
nurturing of religious harmony and the promotion of a genuinely multiracial 
and democratic society”.46 
                                           
38 Ibid., 44. 
39 Ibid., 45. 
40 Ibid., 45. 
41 Zubaidah Rahim, "Governing Muslims in Singapore's Secular Authoritarian State," 179. 
42 Mutalib, "Singapore’s Ethnic Relations’ Scorecard," 34, 49. 
43 Zubaidah Rahim, "Governing Muslims in Singapore's Secular Authoritarian State," 170. 
44 Ibid., 178. 
45 Ibid., 178. 
46 Ibid., 183. 
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Europe, Asia Pacific and their cultural riddles 
As stated at the beginning, the pretence of this article is that of a preliminary 
exploration. From the point of view of cultural backgrounds, Islam seems to be 
very important in both regions. It is true that the situation in Singapore is not 
representative of the whole of Asia Pacific. Indeed, as seen above, Singapore 
represents almost an anomaly in its immediate surroundings, what Mutalib 
calls “the Malay world”. Further research about the way in which Buddhists, 
Christians and other minorities are perceived and tolerated in countries like 
Indonesia or Malaysia would help to complete the picture.  
However what has been exposed here is enough to see the importance that 
religious, ethnic and other differences can have for the cohesion, the political 
identity of entities which go from city-states like Singapore, to supra-national, 
stateless polities such as the EU.  
Interculturalism, the active recognition of, learning about, and interaction 
with “the other” in the political community, can provide a useful way to 
addressing the cultural riddles that arise on each polity. At the same time, it is 
clear that the source of unity, the “political identity” that holds together polities 
may not necessarily coincide in the cases of Europe and the Asia Pacific. In fact, 
it may be different. It would seem that in the EU a certain commonly shared 
idea of human rights has overall acceptance. That would not necessarily be the 
case in the Asia Pacific.  
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